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Past Trends and Projections in 
Wages, Work, and Occupations 
in the United States
David Autor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
It is widely recognized that inequality of labor market earnings in 
the United States has increased dramatically in recent decades. This may 
be seen in Figure 3.1, adapted from Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), 
which plots the growth of real hourly wages of U.S. workers (both male 
and female) by earnings percentile for the years 1973 through 2005. 
Over the course of more than three decades, wage growth was weak 
to nonexistent at the bottom of the distribution, strong at the top of the 
distribution, and modest in the middle. While real hourly earnings of 
workers within the bottom 30 percent of the earnings distribution rose 
by no more than 10 percentage points, earnings of workers at the nineti-
eth percentile and above rose by more than 40 percentage points. 
What is less widely known, however, is that this smooth, monotonic 
growth of wage inequality is a feature of a specific time period—and 
that this time period has passed.1 Figure 3.2, adapted from Autor, Katz, 
and Kearney (2006), shows that, consistent with common perceptions, 
the growth of wage inequality between 1973 and 1989 was strikingly 
linear in wage percentiles, with sharp drops in real wages at the bottom 
of the distribution and modest increases at the top.2 Yet, starting in the 
late 1980s, the growth of wages became polarized, as wages experi-
enced strong, ongoing growth in the top of the earnings distribution (at 
or above the seventieth percentile) and modest growth in the lower tail 
of the distribution (at or below the thirtieth percentile). Notably, the 
portion of the wage distribution that saw the least real earnings growth 
between 1989 and 2005 was the middle, roughly the group of earn-
ers between the thirtieth and seventieth percentiles of the distribution.3 
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Thus, the periods of 1973 to 1989 and 1989 to 2005 present two distinct 
periods of rising inequality: one of diverging wages throughout the dis-
tribution, a second of polarizing wage growth.
What explains the polarization since 1990?4 It is fair to say that 
the question has not yet received an entirely satisfactory answer. One 
potentially promising—though surely incomplete—explanation lies in 




















NOTE: Figure represents March CPS data for earnings years 1963–2005, full-time, 
full-year workers ages 16 to 64 with 0 to 39 years of potential experience whose class 
of work in their longest job was private or government wage/salary employment. Full-
time, full-year workers are those who usually worked 35-plus hours per week and 
worked 40-plus weeks in the previous year. Weekly earnings are calculated as annu-
al earnings divided by weeks worked. Calculations are weighted by CPS sampling 
weights and are deflated using the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator. 
Earnings of below $67/week in 1982 dollars ($112/week in 2000 dollars) are dropped. 
Allocated earnings observations are excluded in earnings years 1967 forward using 
either family earnings allocation flags (1967–1974) or individual earnings allocation 
flags (1975 earnings year forward).
SOURCE: Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008).
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Figure 3.2  Change in Real Male and Female Hourly Wages by 
Percentile, 1973–1989 and 1989–2005
SOURCE: Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), and author’s calculations based on data 





















the changing demand for job tasks spurred by the remarkable spread of 
computerization. The price of computer power has fallen by roughly 
one-third to one-half each year for several decades (Berndt and Rappa-
port 2001). Processing tasks that were unthinkably expensive 30 years 
ago, such as searching the full text of a university’s library for a single 
quotation, are now so cheap that the expense is trivial. This rapid, sec-
ular price decline creates enormous economic incentives for employ-
ers to substitute cheap computers for expensive labor in performing 
workplace tasks. Simultaneously, it creates significant advantages for 
workers whose skills become increasingly productive as computeriza-
tion advances.
But what are the tasks that computers perform?5 One is immedi-
ately tempted to answer, “Everything.” Indeed, it is hard to think of 
a quotidian activity—from checking the weather forecast to investing 
our retirement savings—that doesn’t involve using a computer in one 
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way or another. Yet, although computers are everywhere, they don’t 
do everything—far from it. In fact, computers have a very specific set 
of capabilities and limitations. Ultimately, the ability of a computer to 
accomplish a task is dependent upon the ability of a programmer to 
write a set of procedures (“rules”) that directs what the machine does 
at each possible contingency. This means that computers are “good” at 
the things that people can program them to do—and inept at everything 
else.
For example, computer programs can play an unbeatable game of 
checkers and a nearly unbeatable game of chess. These games follow 
well-described rules and so are reasonably straightforward to program. 
In the workplace, computers accomplish countless data processing and 
clerical activities such as sorting, filing, calculating, storing, retrieving, 
and manipulating information. Similarly, computers now handle many 
of the repetitive assembly and monitoring tasks on the factory floor. I 
refer to these procedural, rule-based activities as “routine” tasks.
Yet there are many essential tasks that workers perform daily for 
which programmers and engineers do not know “the rules.” One such 
set of tasks is abstract thinking—for example, developing a hypothesis, 
making a persuasive argument, creating a new idea or product, or moti-
vating and managing a group of workers. These abstract thinking tasks 
require creativity, intuition, and insight. Though all of us have ideas 
and insights, the science of programming computers to do likewise is 
still in its infancy. Thus, for the moment, abstract thinking tasks require 
educated, creative, and clever people. Moreover, computerization likely 
raises the productivity of workers performing abstract tasks. For exam-
ple, lawyers accomplish faster and more thorough case research by 
tapping into legal databases. Engineers develop products more quickly 
when assisted by computer-aided design tools. Financial professionals 
using powerful machines handle much larger volumes of client money 
than was feasible in the paper-based era. There is abundant evidence 
that the demand for highly educated “abstract” workers has increased 
in the computer era, and it is likely that the complementarity between 
computerization and abstract work is part of the explanation.
But education-intensive, abstract tasks are not unique in their (par-
tial) immunity from automation. A second group of tasks that have 
proved remarkably hard to computerize are so-called manual tasks. 
These are tasks that require on-the-spot flexibility and adaptabil-
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ity. Driving a truck through city traffic, waiting tables at a restaurant, 
checking passengers’ IDs at the airport—these are all tasks that are easy 
for people but “hard” for computers. Why? Because they require com-
plex and rapid interactions with unpredictable factors—erratic traffic, 
hungry restaurant patrons, and unfamiliar faces. Notably, these manual 
tasks do not require high levels of formal education.
One can glimpse the impact that computerization—more recently 
complemented by international outsourcing—is having on job tasks by 
considering the changing occupational structure of U.S. employment.6 
Table 3.1, adapted from Autor and Dorn (2008), reports the educational 
level and employment shares in six major occupational groups cover-
ing all of U.S. employment: 1) managerial and professional specialties; 
2) technicians, sales, and administrative support; 3) precision produc-
tion, craft, and repair; 4) service occupations; 5) operators, fabricators, 
and laborers; and 6) farming, fishing, and forestry occupations. The 
highest skilled of these occupational categories is managerial and pro-
fessional specialty occupations, followed (at some distance) by tech-
nicians, sales, and administrative support. The four remaining catego-
ries—each averaging half the size of the first two—are demonstrably 
less education-intensive. Whereas in the year 2000 high school drop-
outs made up 2.2 percent of employment in professional and manage-
rial jobs and 6.7 percent of employment in technical, sales, and admin-
istrative support jobs, they composed 20-plus percent of employment in 
the four remaining categories.
Growth has not been uniform across these six categories. Figure 
3.3 shows that managerial and professional specialty occupations—
the highest-skilled category—experienced consistent, rapid growth 
between 1980 and 2005, gaining 7.1 percentage points as a share of 
overall employment over those 25 years, a 30 percent increase. In con-
trast, employment in the “middle skill” group of technical, sales, and 
administrative support occupations showed an inverse U-shaped pat-
tern over this period, expanding in the 1980s and then contracting to 
below its initial 1980 level over the next 15 years (consistent with the 
growing substitution of technology for routine tasks). Most striking-
ly, employment shares in three of the four low-skill occupations fell 
sharply in each decade.7 For the entire period of 1980–2005, farming, 
forestry, and fishery occupations contracted by more than 50 percent as 
a share of employment; operators, fabricators, and laborers contracted 
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dropout % no college % female % nonwhite
% foreign- 
born
All occupations 100.0 13.58 12.1 39.3 42.1 21.6 14.2
Service occupations 13.4 9.40 21.3 55.1 51.3 30.8 19.7
All occupations except 
service occupations
86.6 14.42 10.7 36.8 40.8 20.1 13.3
Managerial and professional 
specialty occupations
30.2 19.23 2.2 11.4 46.5 16.2 11.8
Technicians, sales, and 
administrative support
28.8 12.50 6.7 35.0 58.8 20.8 11.6
Farming, forestry, and 
fishery occupations
1.3 7.50 33.0 67.2 14.9 20.6 22.3
Precision production, craft, 
and repair occupations
12.3 14.40 19.9 60.4 8.6 18.7 14.3
Operators, fabricators,  
and laborers
14.0 11.49 27.3 71.9 22.2 28.3 18.6
NOTE: Statistics are calculated from census IPUMS 2000, 5 percent sample. All calculations are weighted by hours of annual labor supply 
and exclude those under age 18 or over age 65.
SOURCE: Autor and Dorn (2008). 
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by 33 percent; and precision production, craft, and repair occupations 
contracted by 19 percent.
Standing in sharp contrast to these patterns of declining employ-
ment, however, is the experience of service occupations.8 Despite being 
among the least educated and lowest paid occupations in the U.S. econ-
omy, service occupations had an employment that expanded in each 
decade between 1980 and 2005, rising from 11.0 percent of employ-
ment in 1980 to 11.8 percent in 1990, to 13.7 percent in 2000, and 
to 14.9 percent in 2005. Overall, employment in service occupations 
gained 35 percent, which is 6 percentage points more than the gain in 
employment shares of managerial and professional occupations during 
the same period. In fact, service occupations constitute the only major 
occupational category that is growing among noncollege workers (that 
is, those with high school or lower education).
Figure 3.3  Employment Share of Major Census Occupation Groups, 
1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005
SOURCE: Autor and Dorn (2008), and author’s calculations based on data from the 
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Why should service occupations be the exception? Table 3.2 lists 
the major service occupations, the largest of which are food preparation 
and service, health service support (a group that excludes registered 
nurses and other skilled medical personnel), and buildings and grounds 
cleaning and maintenance. These are low-paying jobs; in 2005, 75 per-
cent had hourly wages below the overall hourly median. However, from 
the perspective of our conceptual framework, what distinguishes these 
occupations is that each is highly intensive in “nonroutine manual” 
tasks—activities requiring interpersonal and environmental adaptabil-
ity yet little in the way of formal education. These are precisely the job 
tasks that are difficult to automate with current technology because they 
are nonroutine. Moreover, these jobs are difficult to outsource because, 
in large part, they must (at least at the moment) be produced and per-
formed in person.
Employment projections from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) 
Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2006–2007 (BLS 2006) support the 
view that low-education service jobs are likely to be a major contribu-
tor to U.S. employment growth going forward. The BLS forecasts that 
employment in service occupations will increase by 5.3 million, or 19 
percent, between 2004 and 2014.9 The only major occupational cate-
gory with greater projected growth is professional occupations, which 
are predicted to add six million jobs, a 21.2 percent increase.10 Like all 
forecasts, these should be treated as tentative. Historically, the BLS has 
underpredicted the growing demand for professional and managerial 
occupations (Bishop and Carter 1991; Freeman 2006).
This process of employment polarization—in which job growth is 
concentrated among both highly education-intensive, abstract jobs and 
comparatively low-education, manual jobs—presents both challenges 
and opportunities for the United States, as well as for other industrial-
ized economies. The rising productivity of highly educated workers is 
good news; the return on investments in higher education has perhaps 
never been greater. But the growing importance of manual and service 
tasks presents a challenge. The positive news about rising demand for 
in-person service occupations is that it will tend to increase the earnings 
of less-educated workers. The less favorable news is that, even given 
rising demand, labor supply to services may be sufficiently elastic that 
wages stay low. Median real hourly wages in service jobs were $8.86 in 
1980, $9.01 in 1990, $10.24 in 2000, and $10.28 in 2005 (all expressed 
   55
























All service occupations 14.9 9.07 51.9 32.2 23.4 6.7 16.2 17.8
Housekeeping, cleaning, 
laundry
0.9 7.09 82.1 43.9 48.2 −11.0 2.5 12.0
Protective service 2.3 15.55 20.1 27.0 77.0 16.1 8.7 12.3
Food preparation and 
service
4.0 7.21 53.5 31.5 27.5 4.7 11.6 14.4
Health service support 3.0 9.93 75.0 34.7 17.8 4.5 65.0 21.6
Building/grounds 
cleaning/maintenance
2.6 9.09 19.7 32.5 31.3 9.1 −7.9 31.7
Personal appearance 0.7 8.64 82.0 34.2 26.6 5.4 0.0 20.3
Child care 0.8 6.91 94.4 32.0 19.8 8.9 59.2 −5.1
Recreation and 
hospitality
0.4 10.37 47.9 29.6 18.0 17.6 85.0 10.8
Other personal service 0.4 10.80 57.8 20.3 15.5 17.2 0.0 47.1
NOTE: All calculations are weighted by hours of annual labor supply and exclude those under age 18 or over age 65.
SOURCE: Autor and Dorn (2008), calculated from census IPUMS of 1980, 1990, and 2005, 5 percent sample, and from the American 
Community Survey 2005, 1 percent sample. 
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in 2005 dollars). These hourly wage rates imply annual, full-time earn-
ings of approximately $20,000 a year (of course, many service jobs do 
not provide full-time, full-year earnings). This income level exceeds 
the poverty threshold for the year 2000 of $19,350 for a family of two 
adults and two dependent children. Yet this is probably insufficient for 
families to make optimal investments in child-rearing and education.
How should education policy respond to this challenge? One might 
be tempted to reason that if earnings growth is concentrated among the 
most- and least-educated workers, educators should pursue a bimodal 
human capital investment policy: equipping all students with a solid 
foundation in basic skills while reserving high levels of preparation 
(leading to college and graduate education) for an elite. For a number 
of reasons, this argument is unattractive. First, as stressed above, the 
returns to human capital investments are quite high. In the late 1990s, 
the college wage differential stood at a near-historic level, and it has 
risen further in the subsequent decade (see Goldin and Katz 2008), so 
that it now stands at an all-time high.11 Second, though earnings growth 
in low-education jobs exceeds that in middle-education jobs, earnings 
levels themselves are considerably higher in middle- than in low-educa-
tion jobs—and this ranking is unlikely to reverse itself any time soon. 
Finally, universal, high-quality education is perhaps the only public 
investment proven to reliably foster opportunity, raise earnings, and 
increase well-being over the life cycle.12 Thus, while it appears to be 
a legitimate worry that the polarization of earnings levels among U.S. 
households may serve to thwart economic mobility, the best insurance 
policy we have against this undesirable outcome is equipping citizens 
with skills that permit them to take full advantage of the opportunities 
that the future offers. It is not an overstatement to say that the case for 
extensive, universal investments in human capital is as strong at the 
outset of the twenty-first century as it has been at any time in the last 
century.
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Notes
  1. This observation was, to my knowledge, first offered by Mishel, Bernstein, and 
Boushey (2003).
  2. The public-use Current Population Survey and Census of Populations data ana-
lyzed here do not cover the top several percentiles of the earnings distribution, 
where the most dramatic increases in real earnings have occurred during these 
decades (see Piketty and Saez 2003). Including these top percentiles would reveal 
even greater growth at the top throughout the years studied.
 3. It bears noting, however, that all percentiles of the distribution fared better in the 
second half of the time period (1989 through 2005) than in the first (1973 through 
1989), reflecting the acceleration of U.S. productivity growth commencing in the 
mid-1990s.
 4. To my knowledge, Goos and Manning (2007) were the first to refer to the simul-
taneous growth of low- and high-skill jobs (at the expense of the middle) as a 
“polarization” of employment, thus coining that usage of the term to describe this 
phenomenon.
 5. The “task view” of computerization presented here is formalized by Autor, Levy, 
and Murnane (2003) and elaborated on and advanced by Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
(2006, 2008); Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2007); Goos and Manning 
(2007); Levy and Murnane (2004); and Spitz-Oener (2006). Bartel, Ichniowski, 
and Shaw (2007) present detailed, representative evidence on the relationship 
between computerization, work organization, and productivity. Goldin and Katz 
(2008) provide a longer-term historical perspective on the relationship between 
technical change, work organization, and skill demand.
 6. There is vast uncertainty about the degree to which international outsourcing will 
ultimately affect domestic labor demand. At present, most quantitative assessments 
of these potential impacts are preliminary or impressionistic (Blinder 2007; Kletzer 
2006). Levy and Murnane (2006) consider the relationship between computeriza-
tion and outsourcing through the lens of the “task” framework exposited above.
 7. Operator, fabricator, and laborer occupations fell from 19.2 percent of employ-
ment in 1980 to 14.5 percent in 1990, to 13.9 percent in 2000, and to 13.0 per-
cent in 2005. Production, craft, and repair occupations fell from 14.3 percent of 
employment in 1980 to 12.4 percent in 1990, to 12.1 percent in 2000, and to 11.6 
percent in 2005. Farming, forestry, and fishery occupations fell from 2.8 percent of 
employment in 1980 to 1.8 percent in 1990, to 1.3 percent in 2000, and to 1.3 per-
cent in 2005. The sources for these calculations are the census Integrated Public 
Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) files for 1980, 1990, and 2000, and the American 
Community Survey for 2005.
 8. It is important to distinguish service occupations, a relatively narrow group of low-
education occupations composing 13.4 percent of employment in 2000 (author’s 
calculation from the census IPUMS), from the service sector, a broad category of 
industries including everything from health care to communications to real estate 
and constituting 81 percent of nonfarm employment in 2000 (BLS 2009).
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 9. The service employment measure used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occu-
pational Outlook Handbook, 2006–2007 (BLS 2006) indicates a service employ-
ment share that is several percentage points higher than our calculations given in 
endnote 8 (17.7 percent versus 13.4 percent). The discrepancy stems from three 
factors: unlike our calculations, which are based on household data from the cen-
sus, the BLS numbers use Current Employment Statistics (CES) data. The CES, as 
an establishment survey, double-counts workers who hold multiple jobs; our cen-
sus-based numbers are weighted by hours of labor supply, and so part-time jobs 
(common in service occupations) are weighted down, whereas the CES data count 
all jobs equally. Furthermore, our census calculations exclude workers younger 
than 18, whereas the CES data include workers ages 16 and above. The service 
occupation in which the census and CES data are most different is in food prepa-
ration and service, where our data show a 3.5 percent employment share and the 
CES data show a 7.4 percent employment share. Despite these discrepancies in 
levels, we have no reason to believe that the qualitative employment trends in the 
census and CES data are at odds with each other.
 10. The BLS category of professional occupations excludes managerial occupations 
and so is more disaggregated than the census category of professional and mana-
gerial occupations. Combined growth in professional and managerial jobs is pro-
jected at 8.2 million jobs, or 18.8 percent.
 11. The college wage differential is at its highest level since 1915, which is as far back 
as representative U.S. data are available.
 12. Recent work by Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) finds little change in mobility 
over the course of a career among U.S. cohorts born between 1920 and 1950. 
However, these data do not speak to economic mobility across generations—in 
particular, to how likely children of low-income households are to reach higher 
echelons of the earnings distribution during their careers.
References
Autor, David H., and David Dorn. 2008. “Inequality and Specialization: The 
Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs in the United States.” MIT mimeograph. 
Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2006. “The 
Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market.” American Economic Review 96(2): 
189–194.
———. 2008. “Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists.” 
Review of Economics and Statistics 90(2): 300–323.
Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murnane. 2003. “The Skill Con-
tent of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1279–1333.
Bartel, Ann P., Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn L. Shaw. 2007. “How Does 
Past Trends and Projections in Wages, Work, and Occupations   59
Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of 
Product Innovation, Process Improvement and Worker Skills.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 122(4): 1721–1758.
Berndt, Ernst R., and Neal J. Rappaport. 2001. “Price and Quality of Desktop 
and Mobile Personal Computers: A Quarter-Century Historical Overview.” 
American Economic Review 91(2): 268–273.
Bishop, John H., and Shani Carter. 1991. “How Accurate are Recent BLS 
Occupational Projections?” Monthly Labor Review 114(10): 37–43.
Blinder, Alan S. 2007. “How Many U.S. Jobs Might Be Offshorable?” CEPS 
Working Paper No. 142. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Center for 
Economic Policy Studies.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2006. Occupational Outlook Handbook, 
2006–2007. Indianapolis: JIST Publishing.
———. 2009. Industries at a Glance. Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics. http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag07.htm (accessed March 12, 2009).
Dustmann, Christian, Johannes Ludsteck, and Uta Schönberg. 2007. “Revisit-
ing the German Wage Structure.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 2685. Bonn, 
Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor.
Freeman, Richard B. 2006. “Is A Great Labor Shortage Coming? Replacement 
Demand in the Global Economy.” NBER Working Paper No. 12541. Cam-
bridge, MA: Nationa Bureau of Economic Research.
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2008. The Race between Education 
and Technology. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Goos, Maarten, and Alan Manning. 2007. “Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising 
Polarization of Work in Britain.” Review of Economics and Statistics 89(1): 
118–133.
Kletzer, Lori G. 2006. “The Scope of Tradable Services and the Task Content 
of Offshorable Services Jobs.” UC Santa Cruz mimeograph. Santa Cruz, 
CA: University of California, Santa Cruz.
Kopczuk, Wojciech, Emmanuel Saez, and Jae Song. 2007. “Uncovering the 
American Dream: Inequality and Mobility in Social Security Earnings Data 
since 1937.” NBER Working Paper No. 13345. Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Levy, Frank, and Richard J. Murnane. 2004. The New Division of Labor: How 
Computers Are Creating the Next Job Market. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
———. 2005. “How Computerized Work and Globalization Shape Human 
Skill Demands.” MIT-IPC Working Paper 05-006. Cambridge, MA: Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Industrial Performance Center.
Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. 2003. The State of 
Working America, 2002/2003. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
60   Autor
Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2003. “Income Inequality in the United 
States, 1913–1998.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 1–39.
Spitz-Oener, Alexandra. 2006. “Technical Change, Job Tasks, and Rising Edu-
cational Demands: Looking Outside the Wage Structure.” Journal of Labor 
Economics 24(2): 235–270.
Strategies for Improving 
Economic Mobility of Workers





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Strategies for improving economic mobility of workers : bridging research and 
practice / Maude Toussaint-Comeau and Bruce D. Meyer, editors.
  p. cm.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-352-4 (pbk : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-352-9 (pbk : alk. paper)
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-353-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-353-7 (hardcover : alk. paper)
 1. Migration, Internal—United States. 2. Occupational retraining—United States. 3. 





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
Toussaint-Comeau.indb   4 7/1/2009   11:16:36 AM
